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RATIONAL STANDARD SETTING IN LAWYER QUALIFICATION:
A CRITICAL LOOK AT THE PROPOSAL OF THE NEW YORK
BOARD OF LAW EXAMINERS TO INCREASE THE
PASSING SCORE ON THE BAR EXAMINATION

Frederick Linkt
In September 2004, the New York Board of Law
Examiners approved a two year old proposal to increase the
passing score on the New York Bar Examination. Citing a threeyear long study' conducted by Stephen Klein, a nationally
recognized expert in psychometric testing,2 an alleged increase in
the difficulty of legal practice 3 and the fact that New York's4
passing multi-state bar exam score is below the national average
caused the Board to propose to increase the minimum passing
score on the New York Bar Exam from 660 to 675. 5
In basing its recommendation, at least in part, on a study
conducted by Klein, New York was following the lead of Florida,
Minnesota, and Ohio, each of whom had increased their minimum
passing bar exam scores based on studies conducted by Klein using
essentially the same methodology as employed in the New York
study. 6 In each study, panels of outside experts were asked to
evaluate an applicant's legal ability based on their answers to
individual essay questions.7 The experts' evaluations of legal
ability were then correlated with the applicant's score on that
question and a recommendation was made as to the appropriate bar
t A.B., University of Michigan; J.D., Harvard Law School; Ph.D.,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. flink@alum.mit.edu.
1 Klein, Stephen P., Reader and Panelist Judgments Regarding the Passing
Score on the New York Bar Exam (Feb. 9, 2002) available at
http://www.nybarexam.org/report.pdf.
2 N.Y. ST. BD. OF LAW EXAMINERS, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE
NEW
YORK STATE BOARD OF LAW EXAMINERS TO THE COURT OF APPEALS REGARDING
THE PASSING STANDARD ON THE NEW YORK STATE BAR EXAMINATION (2002),

availableat http://www.nybarexam.org/report.pdf
3 See id. at 17.
4 See id. at 9.
5 See id. at 19.
6 See id. at7.
7 See Klein, supra note 1, at 4.
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exam passing score.
Opponents in New York and elsewhere, of increasing the
bar exam passing score, have criticized Klein's methodology and
the resulting proposals to increase the bar exam passing score on
several grounds. Some have suggested that raising the passing
score for the-bar exam will cause law school curricula to become
increasingly focused on teaching to the test rather than teaching
other skills necessary to prepare students for the practice of law. 9
In this way, raising the bar exam passing score may actually reduce
the quality of lawyers permitted to practice law.' 0 Others have
expressed concerns that raising the passing score will affect
minority bar applicants adversely."
In the only published article that critiques Klein's
methodology, Deborah Merritt, Lowell Hargens and Barbara
Reskin argue that the methodology is unreliable because it focuses
on answers to individual questions. 12 They argue that because
applicants who write failing answers to a single question may still
pass the exam as a whole, no study focusing on answers to
individual questions could provide accurate estimates Of the
appropriate passing score for the bar exam.13
While there have been numerous critiques of Klein's
8

See id. at 6-7.

9 See Soc'y OF AM. LAW TEACHERS, STATEMENT ON THE BAR EXAM 1 (2002),

availableat http://www.saltlaw.org/positionbarexam.htm.
'o See id. at 3-4.

"See id. at 4-5; COMM. ON LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSION TO THE BAR OF THE
Ass'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y., REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON LEGAL
EDUCATION AND ADMISSION TO THE BAR OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF
THE CITY OF NEW YORK IN OPPOSITION TO THE BOARD OF LAW EXAMINERS'
PROPOSAL TO INCREASE THE PASSING SCORE ON THE NEW YORK BAR
EXAMINATION 4-5 (January 2003); FLA. STATE CONFERENCE OF NAACP
BRANCHES, RESPONSE TO BAR EXAMINERS' PROPOSED BAR EXAM PASS/FAIL
LINE AMENDMENT (April 2000) (arguing that the Florida Bar Examiners'
proposal to increase the passing standard on the Florida bar exam would

adversely impact minority applicants).
12 See Deborah J. Meritt, Lowell L. Hargens & Barbara F. Reskin, Raising the
Bar: A Social Science Critiqueof Recent Increases in PassingScores on the Bar
Exam, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 929 (2001).
13See id. at 949.
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methodology and proposals to raise bar exam passing scores based
on Klein's studies, this is the first critique to describe a theory of
the costs and benefits of raising the bar exam passing score, and its
setting, and to evaluate Klein's methodology in relation to that
theory. It is also the first to rigorously evaluate the statistical
methods used in the study commissioned by the Board of Law
Examiners.
The goal of this paper is threefold; 1) to highlight the
factors which should be considered in determining an optimal bar
exam passing score; 2) to critique the methodology employed in
Dr. Klein's study; and 3) to provide suggestions to improve that
methodology. In Section I of the paper, I present a simple model
of the legal market which I use to describe the factors which
should be considered in setting the optimal passing score. I argue
that the optimal passing score should be set at a level where the
marginal benefit due to improving lawyer quality is equal to the
marginal cost due to the reduction in the number of lawyers
permitted to practice law. Section II briefly describes and evaluates
Klein's methodology and concludes that it is not "well
conceptualized and well conducted"' 4 but rather it is incapable of
producing a reliable estimate of the appropriate passing score for
Finally, improvements to the
the New York Bar Exam.
methodology used in the study are suggested in Section III.

14See WILLIAM MEHRENs, REVIEW OF THE KLEIN STUDY ON STANDARDS FOR

THE NEW YORK BAR ExAM

1 (Feb. 2002).
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A THEORY OF THE OPTIMAL BAR EXAM PASSING SCORE

Any discussion of setting the optimal passing score on the
bar exam must begin with a description of the effect of the bar
exam passing score on the well-being of the citizens of New York,
i.e. social welfare, and the factors which must be considered in
determining the score which maximizes social welfare.' 5 Such a
discussion is noticeably absent from the Board of Law Examiner's
proposal. While the Board mentions briefly the "very real harm
that can be caused by an incompetent lawyer"' 6 , which would
presumably be reduced by raising the minimum bar exam passing
score, there is no discussion of potential trade-offs involved in
raising the passing score. Instead, the Board simply assumes that
optimal passing standard is one which "best expresses the
performance standard of minimum competence,' 7 by which they
apparently mean the score which minimizes the sum of the number
of incompetent lawyers permitted to practice law and the number
of competent lawyers denied the right to practice law.
The economic literature dealing with occupational licensing
provides a good framework for describing the costs and benefits to
social welfare of increasing the bar exam passing score. This
section draws upon that literature to describe a simple economic
model of the market for legal services and uses that model to
15 See generally, Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare,

114 HARV. L. REv. 961 (2001). Kaplow and Shavell argue that the appropriate
metric to judge the effect of a policy is social welfare, which is broadly defined
to include any effects of a policy change on an individuals' well-being. No
independent weight should be given to notions of fairness, which they define as
principals not concerned with the well-being of individuals, because advancing a
notion of fairness at the expense of social welfare will reduce some individuals'
well-being. With respect to the setting of the minimum bar exam passing score,
this principal suggests that the Board of Law Examiners should consider the
effect of the passing score on the well-being of lawyers and consumers of legal
services. The Board should not seek to minimize the number of incompetent
lawyers permitted to practice law and the number of competent lawyers who are
denied the right to practice law without first considering whether such a goal
maximizes the well-being of lawyers and consumers of legal services.
16See N.Y. STATE BD. OF LAW EXAMINERS, supra note 2, at 20.

"Id. at 21.

2004-2005

RationalStandardSetting

discuss the factors which must be considered in 8setting a socially
optimal minimum passing score on the bar exam.'
A. A Brief Description of a Model of the Market for
Legal Services
The simple model of the legal market presented in this
section begins with a few assumptions. For the sake of simplicity,
assume there are only two types of lawyers: talented and less
talented. Potential consumers of legal services are assumed to
have problems of varying levels of difficulty. 19 Consumers with
more difficult problems are assumed to value the services of a
talented lawyer more than consumers with less difficult legal
problems (both relative to having no lawyer at all and relative to
hiring a less talented lawyer).
For example, in criminal law, defendants charged with
serious criminal offenses such as murder value the services of a
talented lawyer (both relative to having no lawyer and relative to
having a less talented lawyer) more than defendants charged with
lesser offenses such as drunk driving. Likewise, defendants
charged with lesser criminal offenses value legal services more
than defendants charged with minor traffic violations.
Furthermore, it is assumed that each lawyer can represent
only a limited number of clients and that there are more potential
While the specifics of the model presented below are original, the model
draws on previous economic models of minimum quality standards including
Hayne E. Leland, Quacks, Lemons, and Licensing: A Theory of Minimum
Quality Standards, 87 THE J. POL. ECON. 1328 (Dec. 1979) and Carl Shapiro,
Investment, Moral Hazard and Occupational Licensing, 53 REV. OF ECON.
STUD. 843 (1986). For an excellent summary of the economic literature on
occupational licensing see Morris M. Kleiner, OccupationalLicensing, 14 J. OF
ECON. PERSP. 189 (Autumn 2000).
19 The label "difficulty" is not tremendously important. "Importance" or "value"
could have been used instead. The important point is that there is some
dimension along which the value to consumers of legal services increases.
18
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consumers of legal services than can be represented by lawyers.2 0 A
lawyer will represent the client who offers to pay him the most.
Finally, it is assumed that the Board seeks to maximize
social welfare, which this model defines as the sum of the value of
legal services provided.2 '
B. The Legal Market when a Lawyer's Ability is
Observable to Consumers
The legal market in which consumers can observe a
lawyer's talent is depicted in Figure 1, assuming that hiring either a
talented or a less talented lawyer would have a positive value to a
consumer of legal services.

20

It is undoubtedly true that many lawyers base their decisions about which

cases to accept on principals other than the amount that a client is willing to pay.
This fact does not affect the results of the model in any meaningful way. First,
many lawyers, if not most, do respond to financial incentives when deciding
which cases to take. Second, lawyers who choose cases based on some other
criteria of importance are allowing their own judgment to perform the role of the
price system in the model. For example, in a model where price determines
which cases a lawyer accepts, those with the greatest willingness to pay hire
lawyers while those who are not willing to pay as much do not hire lawyers. See
infra section I. C. If a lawyer bases his decision on which case to accept on a
different measure of importance, then he will represent the clients with what he
regards as the most important cases and will not represent clients with less
important cases. Certainly, this has implications for which clients are able to hire
lawyers. However, it does not affect the basic predictions of the model as to the
effect of raising the bar exam passing score on the market for legal services.
21

See generally

(1995).

ANDREU MAS-COLELL ET AL., MICROECONOMIC THEORY

117
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Figure I
Value of
Legal
Services

Value of Legal Services
Provided by Talented
wyers

!La

Social Welfare From
Talented Lawyers
Social Welfare From
Less Talented Lawyers

Value of Legal Services
Provided by Less
Lawyers

---------WI: - -Talented

D
NL

Nil

M

The horizontal access in Figure 1 represents the difficulty
of legal problems, D, where M represents the maximum difficulty
of a legal problem. The vertical axis represents the value of legal
services provided by a talented or a less talented lawyer. The
upper diagonal line represents the value of legal services provided
by talented lawyers, while the lower diagonal line represents the
value of legal services provided by less talented lawyers. Since the
value of legal services provided by each type of lawyer increases
as the difficulty of the legal problem increases, both lines are
upward sloping. Moreover, because the value of legal services
provided by a talented lawyer relative to the value of legal services
provided by less talented lawyers is increasing with the difficulty
of legal problems, the gap between the two diagonal lines widens
as difficulty increases.
Consumers with the most difficult legal problems will
value the services of a talented lawyer more than consumers with
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less difficult problems. Because lawyers will represent whichever
clients pay them the most and clients with the most difficult legal
problems value talented lawyers the most, clients with the most
difficult problems will hire the most talented lawyers. In Figure 1,
the consumers who hire the talented lawyers are labeled NH.
As long as hiring a less talented lawyer is better than hiring
no lawyer at all, potential consumers with moderately difficult
legal problems will not be willing to pay talented lawyers as much
as consumers with the most difficult legal problems. However
they will be willing to pay less talented lawyers more money than
consumers with the least difficult legal problems. Consequently,
the less talented lawyers will be hired by consumers with
moderately difficult legal problems. In Figure 1, these consumers
are labeled NL.
If, contrary to the circumstance depicted in Figure 1, hiring
a less talented lawyer was worse than not hiring a lawyer, (i.e. if
the lawyer were incompetent rather than merely less talented), then
less talented lawyers in the figure would never be hired since
consumers would recognize that they would be better off without a
lawyer. In that case, only talented lawyers would be hired.
In either case, consumers with the least difficult legal
problems will not hire a lawyer since they do not value legal
services enough to bid more for the lawyer's services than any
consumer who has hired a lawyer. In Figure 1, these consumers
have legal problems with difficulty to the left of those labeled NL.
Now, return to the murder, drunk driving, and minor traffic
violation defendants, discussed above. This result suggests that
those charged with murder will hire the most talented lawyers;
defendants charged with drunk driving will hire less talented
lawyers; and those charged with minor traffic violations will not
hire a lawyer.
Social welfare is depicted on the graph as the shaded area
under the lines representing the value of legal services provided by
lawyers of each type.22 If consumers can observe a lawyer's type,
22

The area under each line represents the sum of the value of legal services

provided by lawyers of that type. See generally CARL P. SIMON & LAWRENCE
BLUME, MATHEMATICS FOR ECONOMISTS 890-92 (1994). Since social welfare is

2004-2005

Rational StandardSetting

then any action by the Board of Law Examiners to prohibit a
lawyer (of either type) from practicing law will weakly reduce
social welfare. 23 If the Board of Law Examiners were to deny any
lawyer the ability to practice law, however, it would be denying
some consumer the right to hire a lawyer. Because the consumer
would not have hired a lawyer who did not make him better off,
then denying any consumer the ability to hire a lawyer will make
him worse off and will reduce social welfare. Moreover, there will
be no increase in the talent level of lawyers hired by any consumer
since the consumers with difficult legal problems will continue to
hire the talented lawyers while those with moderately difficult
legal problems will continue to hire less talented lawyers.
C. Lawyer's Ability Unobservable to Consumers
The market for legal services differs significantly if
consumers cannot observe the legal talent of lawyers they may
hire. Figure 2 depicts the market for legal services when
consumers cannot observe a lawyer's talent.

defined as the sum of the value of legal services provided by lawyers, see supra
section I. A, this size of the shaded area represents the value of social welfare.
23 Excluding a lawyer who can provide valuable legal services from practicing
law will necessarily reduce social welfare because it denies someone the ability
to hire a lawyer who could help him. If a less talented lawyer whose services
make his clients worse off is excluded from practicing law, then social welfare
will be unchanged since no consumer would have hired him.
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Figure 2
Value of
Legal
Services

Value of Legal Services
Provided by Talented
Lawyers

Value of Legal Services
Provided by Less Talented
Lawyers

NL

Nil

M

If a lawyer's talent is not observable to consumers, then a
consumer will not know whether he is hiring a talented or a less
talented lawyer. Instead, he will expect to hire a talented lawyer
with a probability equal to the proportion of talented lawyers
among all lawyers practicing law. 24 Similarly, he will expect to
hire a less talented lawyer with a probability equal to the
proportion of less talented lawyers among all lawyers practicing
law. Consequently, the expected value of legal services received
by a consumer hiring a lawyer will be the average value of legal
services provided by talented and less talented lawyers, weighted
by the probability that a consumer
will hire a talented or less
25
respectively.
lawyer,
talented
In Figure 2, this average value is depicted by the dashed
line between the value of legal services provided by talented
24 See JACK HIRSHLEIFER & JOHN G. REILLY, THE ANALYTICS OF UNCERTAINTY

AND
INFORMATION,
25

See id. at 13-23.

353-54 (1992).
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lawyers and the value of legal services provided by less talented
lawyers.
Assuming the average value of legal services is positive,
consumers with the most difficult legal problems will again be
willing to pay more than consumers with moderately difficult legal
problems, who in turn, will be willing to pay more than consumers
with the least difficult legal problems. As a result, consumers with
legal problems of moderate or greater difficulty will hire lawyers
while those with the least difficult legal problems will not hire
lawyers.
The number of consumers who would hire a less talented
lawyer who might do harm to their interests would be greater in the
legal market described in this section, because some consumers
who are unable to observe the lawyer's talent would unwittingly
hire an incompetent lawyer, rather than merely a less talented one.
In such a case, banning an incompetent lawyer from practicing law
will clearly increase social welfare, since it will prevent a
consumer from being harmed and increase the average talent of
those lawyers who are permitted to practice law.
If hiring a less talented lawyer is better than not hiring a
lawyer at all, the number of consumers hiring lawyers is the same
whether the consumer's type is observable or not. The difference,
when a lawyer's ability is not observable to consumers, is that
there is no way to ensure that the most difficult cases are handled
by talented lawyers.
When the lawyer's ability is observable, the talented
lawyers handle the most difficult cases while the moderately
difficult cases are handled by less talented lawyers. When the
lawyer's ability is not observable, sorting can not take place.
Some of the most difficult cases will be handled by less talented
lawyers, while some moderately difficult cases will be handled by
talented lawyers. This will reduce the expected value of legal
services provided to consumers with the most difficult legal
problems and increase the expected value of legal services
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provided to consumers with moderately difficult legal problems.
Since the value of a talented lawyer, relative to the value of a less
talented lawyer, is greater for the most difficult cases, the lack of
sorting results in a net loss of social welfare when compared to
where the lawyer's ability was observable.
The effect of banning a less talented lawyer from practicing
law is depicted in Figure 3.
Hguie 3
Value of
Legal
sevices

Value of legal Saemes
Provided by Talented
Lawyers

Average Vlue of Legal
Services Before and After
Reduction in Nunter of
Less Talented Lawyers

Value of legal Sevices
Provided by Less Talented
LawAyers

M

As is the case when a lawyer's ability is observable,
banning a less talented lawyer from practicing law denies some
consumer the ability to hire a lawyer. As discussed above, if hiring
a less talented lawyer is better than having no lawyer at all,
denying some consumer the ability to hire a less talented lawyer
makes that person worse off and results in a social welfare loss. In
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Figure 3, this loss in social welfare associated with denying a
consumer the ability to have a lawyer is depicted by the shaded
area labeled "Decrease in Welfare Due to Reduction in the Number
of Lawyers."
Unlike where the lawyer's ability is observable, when the
lawyer's ability is unobservable, banning a less talented but
productive lawyer has a benefit, as well as a cost. Specifically,
banning a less talented lawyer will decrease the probability that a
consumer hiring a lawyer will hire a less talented lawyer and will
increase the probability that he will hire a talented lawyer.
Consequently, the average ability level of lawyers who are
permitted to practice law will increase. Because the average value
of legal services increases with the average ability of lawyers, this
increase in the average ability will thus increase social welfare.
Banning a less talented lawyer from practicing law will
prevent some consumer with a moderately difficult legal problem,
(e.g. a minor commercial dispute), from hiring a lawyer, which
leads to a reduction in social welfare. Simultaneously, murder and
assault defendants will have a greater likelihood of hiring a
talented lawyer. Since they value a talented lawyer more than a
consumer with a minor business dispute, this increases social
welfare. This benefit to banning a less talented lawyer from
practicing law is depicted in Figure 3 as the shaded area
labeled
26
"Increase in Welfare Due to Increase in Lawyer Quality."
26

Banning a lawyer from practicing law may not be the only way of improving

the average quality of lawyers hired by those consumers with more difficult
legal problems. For example, if the Board of Law Examiners simply certified
some lawyers as talented, then their type would be observable to consumers of

legal services and consumers with the most difficult legal problems would hire
talented lawyers with certainty. See supra section I. B.; see also Kleiner, supra
note 18, at 200 (discussing certification as a possible alternative to licensing).
Another possibility is simply to require that difficult legal problems be handled
by licensed lawyers while allowing moderately less difficult legal problems to
be handled by unlicensed lawyers. This would also match consumers with
difficult legal problems with talented lawyers, but would not deny any
consumers the ability to hire a lawyer.
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Banning a talented lawyer will decrease social welfare
since it will both deny some consumer the ability to hire a lawyer
and reduce the average quality of lawyers practicing law.
D. The Bar Exam
In reality, the Board of Law Examiners cannot observe
which lawyers are talented and which lawyers are less talented. As
a result, it must rely on other criteria, such as the bar exam, to
distinguish between talented and less talented lawyers.
Although the bar exam is not a perfect measure of
competence, increasing the score on the bar exam has the same
qualitative effect on social welfare as banning a less talented
lawyer from practicing law. First, increasing the passing score will
decrease the number of lawyers practicing law and will, therefore,
deny some potential consumers the ability to hire a lawyer.
Second, as long as the lawyers who are denied the right to practice
law (because of the increase in the passing score) are more likely
to be less talented than the percentage of less talented lawyers in
the population of practicing lawyers allowed, increasing the score
will raise the average level of legal ability among lawyers
generally.
However, since increasing the passing bar exam score will
deny some talented lawyers and some less talented lawyers the
ability to practice law, the increase in average legal ability will be
less for any given number of lawyers denied the right to practice
than it would be if the less talented lawyers could be barred from
practicing directly. Indeed, the higher the percentage of talented
lawyers that are banned, the smaller the increase in average talent.
As a result, the social benefit resulting from an increase in average
legal ability will become lower as the "more" talented lawyers are
barred from practicing because of an increase in the bar exam
passing score.
The passing score that maximizes total social welfare will
occur when the social benefit of increasing the average legal ability
exactly equals the social cost associated with denying consumers
the ability to hire a lawyer. Graphically, this will occur at the point
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Figure 3 are the same size for a
where the two shaded regions in 27
score.
passing
the
small change in
It should be noted that the optimal score will generally not
be the score which minimizes the. number of mistaken
classifications, (i.e. the number of talented lawyers prohibited from
practicing plus the number of less talented lawyers permitted to
practice).
E. Other Considerations
The simple model of the legal market discussed above has
omitted several factors which the Board of Law Examiners might
wish to take into consideration when setting the passing score on
the bar exam.
First, raising the passing score may encourage people to
study harder in law school and may, therefore, increase the number
of talented attorneys. 28 In such a case, increasing the minimum
passing score would have an additional benefit, and therefore the
optimal passing score might be higher.29
Alternatively, raising the passing score could cause law
schools to shift resources towards reviewing material that is on the
bar exam and away from teaching other valuable legal skills. 30 In
this case, increasing the passing score might have an additional
cost, and the optimal passing score might therefore be lower than
that suggested in section I. D.3 '
Finally, raising the passing score might adversely impact

27

This is a graphical interpretation of the principal that the maximum value of a

function, (here social welfare), must occur at the value of the independent
variable where the derivative of the social welfare function equals zero. See
SIMON & BLUME, supra note 22 at 53.
28 See, e.g., N.Y. STATE BOARD OF LAW EXAMINERS, supra note 2, at 12.
29 See generally MAS-COLELL ET AL., supra note 21, at 322-23.
30 See supra note 9.
31 See generally MAS-COLELL ET AL., supra note 21, at 322-23.
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the number of minority lawyers. 32 This might be another additional
cost associated with increasing the passing score that might cause
the Board to set a lower passing score than would be suggested by
the simple model outlined above.
F. Summary
It should be clear at this stage that setting an optimal
passing score on the bar exam requires a large amount of
information. In order to make an informed decision, the Board
must determine: 1) the amount of the costs associated with
allowing a less talented lawyer to practice law; 2) the amount of
the costs associated with denying a talented lawyer the right to
practice law; 3) the number of talented and less talented lawyers
that will be denied the right to practice if the score is raised; and 4)
any additional costs or benefits associated with raising the score.
A study of the relationship between an applicant's
competence and his score on the bar exam, such as that conducted
by Klein, can only hope to provide the Board with an estimate of
the numbers of talented and less talented lawyers who will be
denied the right to practice if the score is raised. Although this is
valuable information, it is not enough to justify a change in the bar
exam score, by itself. Instead, the information reported in a study
such as that commissioned by the Board must be combined with
other information to determine the optimal passing score.
II. AN EVALUATION OF THE NEW YORK STUDY
A. A Brief Description of the Study
As mentioned above, to determine the optimal passing
score, the Board of Law Examiners needs to make a judgment
about the relationship between the quality of lawyers passing the
bar exam and the level of the passing standard.
In an attempt to determine this relationship scientifically,
32

See supra note 11.
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the New York Board of Law Examiners hired Klein to conduct a
study of the correlation between applicants' scores on individual
essays from the bar exam and a panel of readers' average
judgments about that applicant's ability (as determined from their
reading of the applicant's answer to the essay question).33
Specifically, the New York study attempts to determine the
appropriate passing score by taking a sample of candidate answers
to individual essay questions and giving them to a panel of lawyers
to read and evaluate. 34 Panelists are asked to give each essay a
reading score of either 1 (failing), 2 (marginally failing), 3
(marginally passing), or 4 (passing essay). 35 This evaluation of an
applicant's legal ability provides a measure of legal talent which
the panelist can use to evaluate the relationship between the
36
applicant's bar exam score and his qualifications to practice law.
Using either cross-classification or linear regression, the
study attempts to determine which "essay score" most closely
corresponds to a panelist score of 2.5, i.e. the midpoint between
are
exams which are marginally passing and those which
37
marginally failing according to the panelists' evaluations.
The study then assumes that the percentage of applicants,
who have written answers with essay scores above the level that
Klein has estimated to correspond to an average panelist score of
2.5 is the percentage of applicants who should pass the test as a
whole. The scaled score (the score on the bar exam as a whole) is
See N.Y. STATE BD. OF LAW EXAMINERS, supra note 2.
See Klein, supra note 1, at 3-4.
35
See id. at 4.
36 It's not entirely clear that this is how Klein sees the study. Since the point
of
the study is to determine the relationship between the applicant's bar exam score
and their competence, the only way to make sense of the readers' evaluations is
as an evaluation of the applicant's talent which can be related to their bar exam
score. However, Klein attempts to relate the readers' evaluations of applicant
essays to their score on that essay, suggesting that for some reason he sees his
study as relating essay quality to essay scores. See infra § 2.3.
37 See KLEIN, supra note 1, at 6.
33
34
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then picked which corresponds to that passing percentage.
This process is repeated for each essay question and the
estimated optimal passing score reported in the study is either the
average of the scaled scores across all of the questions 39or the
scaled score of the average percentage of passing applicants.
As will become clear later, this methodology will not
provide a reliable estimate of the socially optimal passing score for
several reasons.
B. The Study's Focus
The first and most basic criticism of the study
commissioned by the Board of Law Examiners is that it asks the
wrong question. As stated in section I. F., the optimal passing
standard balances the marginal social cost of decreasing the
number of lawyers allowed to practice law against the marginal
social benefit to increasing the average quality of lawyers who are
allowed to practice law. In general, this point will not be the same
as the passing score which would lead to the closest
correspondence between less talented lawyers who fail the bar
exam and talented lawyers passing the exam. Indeed, if the cost of
allowing a less talented lawyer from practicing law is less than the
cost of prohibiting a talented lawyer from practicing law, then the
score will be less than the score which minimizes the number of
mistakes, i.e. sum of the less talented lawyers passing the exam
and talented lawyers who fail. Similarly, if the cost of allowing a
38

See id. at 6. This assumption has been the source of much criticism. See, e.g.,

COMM. ON LEGAL EDUC. AND ADM ISSION TO THE BAR OF THE ASS'N OF THE BAR
OF THE CITY OF N.Y. supra note 11, at 14-15; MERRI7TET. AL.,L. supra note 12,

at 949.
Because the scaled score is not a linear function of the passing percentage, the
average of the scaled score will be slightly different than the scaled score of the
average percentage passing. This difference seems to have been the source of
some earlier criticism of the study's methodology. See MEHRENS, supra note
14, at 4. As should become clear in the remainder of this section, considering
the other serious problems with the study's methodology, worrying about which
average to use seems a bit like worrying about the arrangement of the deck
chairs on the Titanic.
39
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less talented lawyer to practice law is greater than the cost
prohibiting a talented lawyer from practicing law, then the optimal
passing score will be higher. Only if these two costs are the same
will the socially optimal score be 4the score which minimizes the
number of incorrect classifications. 0
Because the determination of the optimal passing score
requires a balancing of costs and benefits, setting the passing
standard for the bar exam requires a political judgment as to the
costs and benefits associated with less talented lawyers being
allowed to practice law and talented lawyers being denied the
opportunity to practice law. Such a judgment must be made by the
Board of Law Examiners and cannot be determined scientifically
by a study such as that commissioned by the Board. Consequently,
a well conceived study should provide the Board of Law
Examiners with information regarding the numbers of talented and
less talented lawyers who will be excluded from practicing if the
passing score is changed, instead of a recommendation about the
appropriate passing score.
C. The Reliability of Klein's Estimates
The methods used in the New York study to estimate the
relationship between an applicant's score on the bar exam and the
readers' evaluations of his competence cannot be relied upon to
produce precise and unbiased estimates of either how the
applicant's ability changes with bar exam scores, or of the score
which correctly classifies the most applicants as either "talented"
or "less talented."
The most puzzling part of the analysis is that it estimates
40

It should be noted that the principal optimal passing score will occur where

the marginal benefit to increasing the passing score is equal to the marginal cost
of increasing the score does not depend on the model presented in section I
being correct. This is generally true no matter what social welfare function the
Board is seeking to maximize. See generally, MAS-COLLELL ET. AL., supra note
21, at 954-55.

Buffalo Public Interest Law Journal

Vol. XXIII

the relationship between the reader's evaluation of their
41
competence and the applicant's score on a single essay question.
Since the goal of the exercise is to estimate the relationship
between an applicant's competence and his Score on the bar exam
as a whole, it seems strange that instead of using an applicant's
entire bar exam score, the study attempts to relate an estimate of
the applicant's competence to the applicant's score on a single
question and then assumes that same correlation must hold as to
the applicant's entire bar exam score.42
Certainly, it is possible that the relationship between
competence and the applicant's score on one question is the same
as the relationship between competence and the applicant's entire
bar exam score, but there is no reason that this must be true. Given
the possibility that there might be a difference, it is clear that the
better practice would have been to estimate the relationship
between the readers' estimates of competence and the applicant's
score on the entire exam.
The precision of the estimates reported in the study is also a
source of concern. The usual approach to determine the precision
of a statistical estimate is to look at the standard error associated
with that estimate.43 Unfortunately, standard errors for the
estimates are not provided in the report,44 which makes it
impossible to tell how accurate those estimates are.
Klein offers two explanations for failing to include
estimates of standard errors. First, he argues that it is unlikely that
See Klein, supra note 1, at 3-4. Although Klein repeats the study design for
each of the six essay questions, readers' evaluations are of only one essay.
42 To understand how strange this is, consider an analogy:
Suppose that an
41

economist wanted to determine the relationship between the unemployment rate
and the inflation rate for the United States economy as a whole, but rather than
use the national unemployment rate in his analysis, he decided to use the
unemployment rate from New York City instead and simply assumed that the
effect would be the same as if he had used the national rate. Certainly, this
would be considered to be more than a bit odd. Yet, Klein has done essentially
the same thing in this study and none of the experts who have commented on
Klein's methodology seem to have noticed.
43

See WILLIAM H. GREENE,

44 See

ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS,

Klein, supra note 1, at 20.

145-50 (4th ed. 2000).
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the Board of Law Examiners would use the standard errors if they
had them.45 It is insinuated that no matter how large the standard
errors, without other information, the most likely passing score is
still the mean estimate published in the report. Second, it is
suggested that because there is (allegedly) a greater cost to
allowing less talented lawyers to practice law than there is to
preventing talented lawyers from practicing law, the greater the
uncertainty as to the appropriate passing standard, the higher the
passing score should be.4 6
Neither of these explanations makes sense from the
prospective of a rational Board seeking to maximize social welfare.
As to the first argument, because the Board has other
information 47 which would allow it to form a view about the
optimal passing score, the size of the standard errors will affect
their view of the optimal passing score. According to the Bayesian
theory of the optimal updating of beliefs when new information is
obtained, the weight given to the new information depends on
its
48
beliefs.
previous
of
error
standard
the
to
relative
error
standard
For example, suppose that before the study was
commissioned a Board member believed that the difficulty of the
legal practice had increased such that the optimal passing score
should be raised to 670, but he was unsure about his estimate.
Further suppose he receives a report, which estimates the optimal
passing score to be 690, with a relatively small standard error. In
other words, assume that the report provides a precise and
relatively certain estimate of the passing score. In this case, a
rational Board member would revise his view of the optimal
passing score upwards to be slightly below the study estimate of
690.
41 See
46

id. at 20.

See id. at 20.

This additional information need not be in the form of a study. It can be the
result of other information gathered from the public, as well as a board
member's experience.
48 See HIRSHLEIFER & RILEY, supra note 24, at 177.
47
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Suppose instead of receiving a report with small standard
errors, the Board member received a report with very large
standard errors. That is, suppose the report's estimate of the
passing score was little more than a good guess regarding the
appropriate passing score and there was a high probability that the
true appropriate score differed considerably from the report's
estimate. In this case, a rational Board member would give
relatively little weight to the report's findings. He would revise his
beliefs upward only a much smaller amount.
Given that a rational Board member would in fact vary his
estimate of the optimal passing score, depending on the size of
those errors, it seems presumptuous to justify the failure to
calculate standard errors on the theory that the Board would not
use standard errors.
The argument that the greater the uncertainty as to the
estimate of the appropriate passing score, the higher the passing
score should be, is also incorrect. Klein cites Mehrens' testimony
in a California Teacher's Licensing case to the effect that there is a
greater need to prevent less talented applicants from teaching than
there is to ensure that talented applicants are able to teach, and,
consequently, that uncertainty as to the appropriate standard should
result in a higher, rather than lower, passing standard. 49 Klein
suggests that a similar concern for the public should cause the
Board to raise the passing standard if there is greater uncertainty.5 °
This argument has several problems. First, Klein and
Mehrens confuse the standard errors of the study's estimate of the
appropriate passing score with the fact that an applicant's score on
his test will reflect some combination of his true ability and a
random error. These are two separate concepts, which have very
little to do with each other. For example, even if there were no
randomness in an applicant's score, there might be some
uncertainty as to the exact relationship between the applicant's
score and the expert's evaluation of his competence due to
differences in the way the experts have evaluated essays receiving
49 See Klein, supra note
50 See id. at 20.

1, at 20.
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similar scores. Similarly, even if there was absolute certainty as to
the relationship between an applicant's score on the bar exam and
the number of talented and less talented applicants who will pass
the bar exam, there may still be some randomness in an applicant's
score.
The standard errors which would be reported in a study,
such as that commissioned by the Board of Law Examiners, are not
measurements of the amount of randomness in an applicant's bar
exam score as Klein and Mehrens seem to assume, but, rather, a
measurement of the uncertainty in the estimated relationship
score and the legal ability of
between an applicant's bar exam
51
applicants.
failing
passing and
Whether greater uncertainty in the estimated relationship
should cause the Board of Law Examiners to raise or lower the
passing standard is far from clear. Assuming that the Board is
seeking to maximize expected social welfare, the direction of the
change in the optimal passing score when uncertainty increases
depends on whether the expected social welfare function has
increasing differences in the Bar exam score and the level of
uncertainty, i.e. whether increasing uncertainty increases or
decreases the expected marginal benefit to increasing that
minimum passing score.5 2 This is a rather technical condition that
is difficult to think about in practice and does not lend itself to
blanket statements about the relationship between standard errors
in a study and action that should be taken by the Board.
report for its failure to
Consequently, the justifications given in the
53
provide standard errors are not compelling.
51 See GREENE, supra note 43, at 247-48.
52

See SUPERMODULARITY AND COMPLEMENTARITY IN ECONOMICS (June 2002),

available at http://www.core.ucl.ac.be/clsAmir/CLS l.pdf.
53 As an aside, the argument that the greater the degree of randomness in an
applicant's score, the higher the passing score should be, is also incorrect.
Section I of this paper makes clear that if the cost of allowing a less talented
applicant to practice law is greater than the cost of preventing a talented
applicant from practicing, then the optimal passing score should be greater than
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Even without standard errors, there is reason to believe that
Klein's methods are not capable of producing estimates which are
both unbiased and adequately precise. Both methods used in the
study (cross-classification and regression) to estimate the passing
score gain most of their statistical power by including answers that
most reasonable people would agree were either certainly passing
or certainly failing. Because these exams are irrelevant to the issue
in question - the relationship between the experts' views and the
applicants' scores for the set of exams which are classified as
either marginally passing or marginally failing - their inclusion in
the study will lead, at the very least, to a false sense of accuracy
and under some circumstances may lead to biased results.
With respect to the cross-classification estimates, the
inclusion of "clearly-passing" and "clearly-failing" answers
increases the apparent accuracy of the findings by increasing the
proportion of answers that are correctly classified. Since many, if
not most, of the essays will be either "clearly-passing" or "clearlyfailing," it is likely that the study's estimates are based only on a
few observations.
If his estimates are based only on a few observations, then
each observation plays a significant role in determining the
estimate of the score which correctly classifies the most applicants
as either "talented" or "less talented". For this reason, the estimate
of the appropriate passing score might vary dramatically if a few
observations had been either classified differently or if different
essays had been selected to be read by the expert readers.
With respect to the regression results reported in the study,
the inclusion of clearly-passing and clearly-failing answers may
lead to a false sense of accuracy and biased results. The regression
the score which minimizes the number of mistaken classifications regardless of
the amount of randomness in an applicant's score. Moreover, since greater
randomness in an applicant's score means that the bar exam is less effective as a
tool for separating talented and less talented applicants, then the greater the
degree of randomness, the smaller the increase in average talent associated with
a given reduction in the number of people passing the bar exam. As discussed in
Section I. D., the smaller the increase in average talent, the lower the optimal
passing score.

2004-2005

Rational StandardSetting

procedure used estimates a linear relationship between the experts'
evaluations of the quality of the answers and the readers' scores.
The actual relationship between the experts' evaluations and
readers' scores must in fact be linear 54 to provide an unbiased
estimate of the appropriate passing score. The study does not,
however, provide any reason to believe that such a linear
relationship exists. Indeed, it seems unlikely that the average
score, given by experts who were asked to place each answer into
one of four categories, should vary linearly with a scaled score
designed to fit a particular non-linear score distribution.
For example, as is illustrated in Figure 4, if talent is a
concave function of the applicant's essay score, using a linear
regression to estimate the relationship between essay scores and
reader's evaluations of competence will likely produce an
overestimate of the score which correctly classifies the most
applicants as either talented or less talented. If talent is a convex
function of the applicant's essay score, then using linear regression
will likely produce an estimate that is biased downwards.

54 See GREENE, supra note 43, at 213.
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scores for talented and less talented lawyers, as well as the
expected number of talented and less talented lawyers at each
score, are depicted in Figure 5.
Figure 5
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The score distributions for talented and less talented applicants
represent the likelihood that talented and less talented applicants
will receive a score S. Talented applicants will on average receive
a score of SH while less talented applicants will on average receive
a score of SL. Both talented and less talented test takers get lucky
or unlucky with the same probability. Consequently, a talented test
taker's actual score may be higher, as well as lower than the
average score. A talented test-taker is just as likely to score at SM,
the midpoint between SH and SL, as a less talented test taker.
Moreover, if there were equal numbers of talented and less talented
test takers, then any test with a score greater than SM would be
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more likely to come from a talented applicant than from a less
talented one. Also a score less than SM would be more likely to
come from a less talented applicant.
However, there are assumed to be more talented than less
talented test takers. In Figure 5, this fact is represented by the
weighted score distribution, which is simply the ordinary score
distribution multiplied by the ratio of talented to less talented
applicants. Because the number of talented test takers is greater
than the number of less talented test takers, the number of talented
test takers scoring at SM will be greater than the number of less
talented test takers. Scores less than SM, but greater than S** will
more likely derive from a talented applicant than from a less
talented applicant, despite the fact that those scores are closer to SL
than to SH.
The score which minimizes the sum of the number of less
talented lawyers who pass the exam and talented lawyers who fail
the exam is, therefore, S** and not SM, as the study seems to
assume. By setting the passing score at the midpoint between the
average score for talented and less talented lawyers, the study
likely overestimates the score which Klein is attempting to
estimate.
In the more realistic case where there is a continuum of
possible talent levels, Klein's methodology will also tend to
overestimate the score which most correctly classifies the highest
percentage of applicants as either talented or less talented.
As is depicted in Figure 6, if there is a continuum of
possible talent levels, the perceived talent distribution will have a
larger variance than the actual talent distribution
and will be more
55
spread out than the actual talent distribution.
55 More formally, assume that the actual talent distribution is distributed

according to some cumulative distribution function T(e), where e is talent.
Because the applicant's legal ability cannot be perceived perfectly, the readers'
evaluation of talent will occur with error, i.e. while the evaluation of talent may
be correct on average it may be either higher or lower than the applicant's actual
talent. Perceived talent can therefore be thought of as the sum of actual talent,
0, and an error in perception, which is assumed to be independent of the
applicant's actual talent. In this case, the variance of perceived talent is equal to
the variance of the actual talent distribution plus the variance of the error term.
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Figure 6
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Klein's estimate of the appropriate failing percentage (and
therefore of the appropriate minimum passing score) is estimated
as the percentage of test-takers who score above the score which
most closely corresponds to the reader's judgment as to the level of
ability that corresponds to a minimally talented lawyer. In Figure
6, the estimated percentage of failing test-takers is the area under
the perceived talent distribution to the left of the level of talent
associated with minimum competence. The actual percentage of
test takers with talent less than the level of minimum competence
is the area to the left of minimum competence under the actual
talent distribution. Because the variance of the perceived talent
distribution is greater than the actual talent distribution, so long as
the level of minimum competence is less than the median level of
competence (i.e. so long as less than half of the lawyers taking the
bar exam should fail), then the area under the perceived talent
distribution to the left of minimum competence level will be
greater than the corresponding area under the actual talent
Since variances are always positive, the variance of the perceived distribution

will be greater than the variance of the actual talent distribution.
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distribution. Therefore, Klein's methodology will overestimate
the percentage of test-takers who are less than minimally talented
and will produce an inappropriately high estimate of the passing
score that will incorrectly classify the greatest number of
applicants as either talented or less talented.
Klein's methodology overestimates the appropriate passing
score when talent is continuous for the same reason that his
methodology overestimates the appropriate passing score when
there are only two talent levels. Because there are more applicants
that are more than minimally talented than there are less than
minimally talented, there will be more talented applicants who
write answers which make them seem less talented than less
talented applicants who appear to be talented.
Because Klein's methodology relies on the perceived talent
distribution rather than the actual talent distribution (which cannot
be observed directly), his estimates will overestimate the number
of applicants with less than minimal competence.
The size of the overestimation will clearly depend on the
size of the variance of the measurement error relative to the
variance of the original distribution. As the variance of the
measurement error becomes larger, the perceived distribution
becomes more spread out. Since the distribution has more weight
in its tails, the difference between the area under the actual talent
distribution and the perceived talent distribution will increase.
The size of the overestimation will also depend on the
estimated minimum level of competence. Because estimated
minimum competence levels that are very low will have few
failing applicants, the difference in the passing percentage will be
small. Also, when the estimated minimum competence level
occurs at the median competence level, the estimated percentage of
passing test-takers will be 50% using either actual or perceived
talent distributions. For estimates of minimum competence which
are less than the median level of talent, the estimated passing
percentage will be too low. For estimates above the median level
of talent, the estimated passing percentage will be too low.
The relationship between the estimated level of minimum
competence and the amount by which the estimate of passing test-
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takers is biased is depicted for various ratios of the standard
deviation of the error term to the standard deviation in the talent
distribution in Figure 7, under the assumption that both
distributions are normal.
Figure 7
Bias vs. Predicted Passing Rate
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As Figure 7 demonstrates, if the standard deviation of the error
term is relatively large and the estimated passage percentage is
somewhere around 70%, the size of the bias can be significant: in
some cases. it approaches 20%.
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III. FIXING THE STUDY

In order to set the appropriate passing score on the bar
exam the Board of Law Examiners needs an unbiased estimate of
the relationship between an applicant's entire bar exam score and
some measure of his/her ability to practice law. Assuming that this
relationship is linear, it can be written as:

(1) o ;i =1si + Ci,

where Oi is an applicant's legal talent, si is his score on the entire
bar exam, and c is a random error. For convenience, both Oi and si
are expressed as differences from their mean. 56 The error term is
assumed to have a mean of zero and to be uncorrelated with the
score.
If an applicant's legal talent could be observed directly,
an
unbiased and consistent estimate of the parameter 03 could be
obtained using ordinary
least squares (OLS), the method used by
57
Klein in his study.
Since 0 is not directly observable, some proxy for talent
must be used in its place. Specifically, Klein's reader's evaluations
of an applicant's ability can be used as a proxy for their ability.
Because the reader's evaluations are merely a proxy for legal
talent, they will differ from an individual's actual legal talent in
many cases, i.e. the applicant's ability is observed with some error.
Specifically, I assume that the reader's evaluation of an applicant's
talent,
(2 ) ®= 0i + v,
where vi, the difference between the reader's evaluation of an
applicant's talent and his actual talent, is assumed to have a mean
of zero. In other words, the reader's evaluations of talent are not
correct in every case, but they are correct on average.
56 This is done for explanatory convenience and does not affect the estimate f3,
which will be the same as if a constant had been used in a regression of the
original variables.
57 See GREENE, supra note 24, at 211.
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Substituting the reader's evaluation of talent into equation
(2), I have:
(3)

E i = fiSi +} Ei +{ V'i"

So long as the readers' error in perceiving talent, oi, is
uncorrelated with the score, si, OLS can be used to obtain an
unbiased and consistent estimate of p.58 Unfortunately, this is
unlikely to be the case.
When an applicant gets lucky on a question that is
submitted to readers, their evaluation of his legal talent will likely
be higher than his actual talent. At the same time, his score on that
question will likely be higher than it would be if he didn't get
lucky. Similarly, if an applicant is unlucky on a question that is
evaluated by the panel of readers, then they will likely give him an
evaluation which underestimates his legal ability and his score on
the question will likely be low. Since the applicants score on the
entire exam is a weighted sum of his scores on each individual
section, there will be a correlation between vi and si.
If vi and si are correlated, using ordinary least squares to
estimate 13will produce biased estimates 59

58 See GREENE, supra note 24, at 334. The error in the readers' evaluation of the
applicant's talent can be thought of as an omitted variable, so long as it is
uncorrelated with any observed variable, OLS will give an unbiased estimate of

13.

59 See id. For those comfortable with some basic math, the OLS estimate of 13is
given by:
N

~

-Z(s)(Oi)
2

I(Si)
i=1
Substituting for E) from equation (3) the estimate of P and rearranging, I have
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Intuitively, applicants may have high scores for two
reasons. First, they may actually be relatively talented. Second,
they may have gotten lucky on part of the exam. Because the
applicant's exam score and the judgment errors about an applicants
talent will be correlated, if OLS is used to estimate 03, then the
estimated relationship will include two parts: (1) the actual
relationship between scores and talent, and (2) the average
overestimation of legal talent that comes when an applicant is
lucky on the answer that is used by readers to estimate his
competence.
Therefore, because the readers' error in judgment as to an
applicant's competence may be correlated with his score on the
question used to evaluate the applicant's competence, it is not
N

N
"

N

N

N

N
i=1N

N

8+

i=1

+

N=

,8, I find that
N

I S

E/8=/+E

N

N

)6NNi=1

Taking the expectation of

N

',

Zi

N------N
+E

E (si)
i=1

2

N

.i

_f6+ cov(si,e,) + cov(si,vi),

NN
Z(si)

2

var(s)

var(s)

i=l

N

where cov is the covariance and var is the variance.
Because si and ei are uncorrelated, the covariance of si and ci is equal to
zero, and the term cov(si, 6i) is equal to zero. Since, si and lui are positively
var(s,)
correlated the term cov(si,oV) is positive and the expectation of 3 reduces

var(si)
to: Eft = fl+ cov(s,,v,)
var(s,)
Since cov(si,o) is greater than zero, the OLS estimate of 3 will, on
var(s1 )
average, be greater than the true 3. In other words, it will be biased upwards.
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appropriate to use OLS to estimate 03, the average relationship
between the estimate of the applicant's ability and his test score.
This kind of bias can be eliminated in one of two ways.
First, a different proxy for talent could be used for where the error
in evaluating a lawyer's talent is not correlated with his bar exam
score. For instance, if panelists were to make judgments about a
lawyer's talent based on his law school grades and other non-test
materials, there would be no correlation between their judgments
about competence and an applicant's luck in taking the
examination. In that case, OLS would produce an unbiased
estimate of the relationship between an applicant's bar exam score
and his legal talent.
Second, evaluations of talent based on an applicant's
answer to a bar exam question can be used if a variable that serves
as an instrument for the applicant's test score is found. For a
variable to be a valid instrument it must be correlated with the
applicant's score on the entire exam and uncorrelated with his
"luck" on the question that the readers use to evaluate an
applicant's legal ability, i.e. it must be capable of predicting, on
average, the portion of an applicant's score on the whole exam not
60
due to luck on the question read by the readers.
In this case, the most obvious choice is the applicant's
score on the entire bar exam, except for the question which is
evaluated by the panel of readers. This partial score is clearly
correlated with the applicant's score on the entire exam.
Moreover, because it does not include the score on the question
read by the panel, any "luck" associated with encountering a
question on an area of law with which the applicant is either very
familiar or very unfamiliar will not be reflected in the score.
Therefore the partial score should not be correlated with errors in
judgment by the panel about the applicant's talent. Consequently,
the applicant's score on the entire exam except on the question
used by readers to evaluate his ability meets the two criteria for a
60

See GREENE, supra note 24, at 680-95.

Buffalo Public Interest Law Journal

Vol. XXIII

61
valid instrument.
Unbiased and consistent estimates of 3 can therefore be
obtained by using a two-stage least squares regression procedure
(2SLS) in which the applicant's partial score is used to predict his
total score on the entire exam in the first stage, and those predicted
total scores can be used in the second stage in place of the actual
test scores to estimate 3.
Intuitively, because "luck" on a particular question cannot
be predicted, the predicted total scores will not be correlated with
mistakes by the panel of readers as to an applicant's ability.
Consequently, using predicted total scores as a proxy for actual
scores will result in unbiased and consistent estimates of the
relationship between talent and an applicant's score on the Bar
62

Exam.

61 It

is possible that some applicants have good days and bad days, i.e. that there

is some correlation between the applicant's luck on different questions. In that
case, the predicted score might be correlated with the error in the evaluation of
the talent. For example, an applicant who has a bad day(s) when taking the bar
exam might have a partial score which is below what he would have received on
a normal day and would seem to be less talented to readers than he is. If this is
true, using the scores on other questions would not be an appropriate instrument.
Of course, there are numerous possible instruments which might be used. For
example, law school grades or LSAT scores (or both) could be used as
instruments since they are both (presumably) correlated with an applicant's Bar
Exam score and should be uncorrelated with any error in evaluating an
applicant's ability. However, since the correlation is likely less than the
correlation between scores on part of the exam and scores on the entire exam,
using LSAT scores or law school grades would result in a less precise estimate.
62

For the more mathematically inclined, assume s = s + w, where s is the

predicted score obtained from regressing the total score on the instrument and o
is the residual from the first stage of the 2SLS procedure. Using s in the OLS
equation in place of s, we have:
N

Z=()

i=1

Substituting for S and

E

gives:
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To test for the possibility that talent, 0, does not vary
linearly with the score, s, the sample can be split and a Chow test
conducted to test for the stability of the estimate of 13. If 13varies
across sub-samples, then the estimate of 13for the range near the
current and proposed passing scores should be used.6 3
Once 13has been estimated, it can be used by the Board of
Law Examiners to assist them in determining the appropriate
passing standard. If the Board wishes to set the passing score at
the point which correctly classifies the most applicants as either
talented or less talented, the 2SLS estimate of 13 can be used in
equation 1 to estimate that score.64

N

N

(Si+ oi)(si+
6 + !)
N

Z(Si +a1 ) 2

N^

(si)(e,)

ZDs)(v,)

(si+ 1 ),

Z(si+ a,)2

N

~

N

Taking the expectation, I find:
El=/3+-i

cov(se) cov(s,v)
+
var(s)
var(s)

Because both of the covariances are zero, the expectation of 8 is equal to the

true P.

See GREENE, supra note 24, at 289-93.
64 See WILLIAM E. GRIFFITHS ET
ECONOMETRICS 131-32 (1993).
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IV. CONCLUSION

The current proposal to raise the passing standard based on
the study commissioned by the Board of Law Examiners is ill
considered for several reasons.
First, while the model of the legal market presented in
section I suggests that the optimal passing standard will occur
where the social cost to denying people the ability to hire lawyers
is balanced against the social benefit associated with improving the
quality of legal representation for those who are able to hire a
lawyer, the standard adopted by Klein's study for making a
recommendation about the appropriate passing score does not
consider these costs and benefits at all. Instead, the study attempts
to estimate the passing standard as the score which correctly
classifies the most applicants as either "talented" or "less talented".
By following the study's criteria, the Board of Law Examiners
have avoided making a judgment about the relative costs of
allowing a less talented applicant to practice law and of prohibiting
a talented applicant from practicing law. In my opinion, the Board
should explicitly consider the relative sizes of the costs and
benefits associated with raising the passing standard before taking
any action.
Second, the study relied upon by the Board of Law
Examiners is simply not capable of producing unbiased and precise
estimates of the appropriate passing score. Techniques such as
those discussed in section III should be used to analyze the
relationship between the test score and the panel of reader's
evaluation of the lawyer's competence. If such techniques are
used, a study such as that conducted by Klein could produce useful
and reliable estimates of the relationship between an applicant's
bar exam score and one measure of legal talent.

